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The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism
The almost quarter century of post-Communist political, social and economic changes
that has elapsed in Russia and some other states of post-Soviet Eurasia has brought
mixed results at best. Even if one were to put aside the dramatic wave of conflicts after
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent confrontation with the
West, these results can be seen as a low-level equilibrium in several areas. If we assess
these changes through the lens of “triple transition” (Offe, 1991) as a modernization in
the three dimensions of democratization, market economy, and state- and nation-
building, their overall consequences appear rather contradictory. Post-Soviet political
regimes represent multiple varieties of authoritarianism, both “hegemonic” and
“electoral” versions (Howard, Roessler, 2006; Levitsky, Way, 2010; Gel’man, 2014).
Post-Soviet market reforms contributed to the rise of patrimonial “crony capitalism”,
which is based upon ruling groups’ political control over key economic assets and
economic actors (Schlumberger, 2008; Robinson, 2011). The quality of governance in
Russia and other  post-Soviet  states is  much poorer than one might expect given their
degree of socio-economic development (Worldwide, 2014), while the rent seeking by
their ruling groups is nearly universally condemned by all observers regardless of their
views on other issues. This triad of authoritarianism, crony capitalism and bad
governance is closely interdependent and interconnected, so  it would not be a wild
exaggeration to argue that the results of post-Soviet changes in Russia are systemic and
self-reproducing, at least in the short run.
Although optimistic scholars argue that economic growth and generation changes of
political leaders might result in major advancements in Russia and other post-Soviet
countries over the next few decades (Shleifer, Treisman, 2014; Treisman, 2014), the
question of the causes and mechanisms of the current trajectories of post-Soviet Russia
is still relevant. Answering it would require a closer look at the institutional foundations
of post-Soviet modernization and the logic and peculiarities of patrimonial governance,
which has posed major constraints to policy reforms and has contributed to unintended
(and often undesirable) consequences of these changes.
Introduction: Russia’s Greatest Rent Machine
For New Year’s Eve 2015, the residents of more than two dozen Russian regions
received an unexpected and unpleasant holiday gift from the authorities. They were
notified that the commuter trains (elektrichki)  which  link  many  cities  and  towns  with
regional capitals were being cut en masse; in some regions they were completely
abolished. Although the frequency of commuter trains had already been reduced,
simultaneously with a steady rise in ticket prices, the elimination of many trains at once
caused major public discontent, especially in those areas where no other public
transportation had been provided. Soon after, one of the leaders of the Russian
opposition, Alexei Navalny, accused both the authorities and the top managers of
Russian Railways holding (RZhD) of “genocide of the Russian people” (Navalny,
2014), while in some Siberian regions attempted collective action by local residents
contributed to threats of rail traffic blockages. The rise in social tension became so
striking and visible that in February 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking
before TV cameras, asked state officials and the RZhD leadership to restore commuter
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trains in full. Shortly afterwards, the return of passenger traffic was announced in the
media (although in reality, it was only a partial return), so the previous status quo was
restored, at least for a while.
The  abolition  of  commuter  trains  was  a  logical  outcome  of  the  changes  to  Russian
railways which had been implemented during the previous decade (Pittman, 2013;
Gaaze, 2015; Khusainov, 2015; Navalny, 2015а). In 2003, in accordance with a decree
by Putin, the long-existing Ministry of Railways (MPS) was transformed into the state-
owned company RZhD, which received the key assets of the railroad sector; later on it
became a joint stock company. Subsequently, the Russian railroads underwent a series
of structural reforms intended to liberalize the sector. Many reform projects, oriented to
follow best international practices (Pittman, 2013; Khusainov, 2015), proposed that
RZhD should separate profitable cargo transportation from unprofitable passenger
traffic, while state policies should pave the way toward a competition of private
companies on the market. But in reality RZhD not only preserved but even strengthened
its monopolist position; it de-facto dictated outstandingly high tariffs and requested that
the state cover the increasing losses of its subsidiary companies, which were in charge
of operating commuter trains. These companies, in turn, leased trains and rails from
RZhD and paid  it  outstandingly  high  fees  for  the  use  and  service  of  trains  (owned by
RZhD), while their losses were compensated in full from the budget. In 2011, the
responsibility for covering these losses was transferred to the regional authorities, which
do not have the funds to feed RZhD’s appetites (and in fact have to cover many other
expenditures due to previous requests from the federal authorities)2 and lack the
capacity to resist RZhD. Moreover, in January 2015, in accordance with RZhD’s
request, the federal government drastically increased fees for the use of rail
infrastructure, thus aggravating the financial burden on regional authorities to subsidize
commuter trains (Navalny, 2015а). Putin’s subsequent call for action did not change the
economic  model  of  commuter  trains;  at  best,  responsibility  to  cover  losses  was
transferred from regional budgets to federal coffers (with the annual amount estimated
at 22 billion rubles), but the taxpayers were still having to pay any bills presented by
RZhD.
Although experts rightly observe that the problem of subsidizing unprofitable yet
socially important commuter trains is hardly unique to Russia, and relevant for railroad
reforms elsewhere (Pittman, 2013), the case of RZhD was atypical not only due to the
scope of these problems but also due to their solution. In essence, reforms resulted in
the transformation of a state agency, MPS (a legacy of a centralized planned economy),
into a gigantic monopoly, RZhD, which was formally owned by the state and operated
on the market, but was in practice outside state control, and which operated for the
benefit of its top managers. Vladimir Yakunin, the CEO of this holding, was one of the
key members of Putin’s “inner circle” (Petrov, 2011) and famous not only because of
his conspicuous consumption of luxury material goods (his big estate near Moscow has
been nicknamed “fur storage”, or shubokhranilishche) but also because of his spike in
international status as a public intellectual. Yakunin, a doctor of political sciences who
chaired the department of state governance at Moscow State University, is a patron of
the  Russian  Society  of  Political  Scientists  and  President  of  the  World  Public  Forum
2 The regional budgets bear responsibility for implementation of Vladimir Putin’s May 2012
decrees, which called on regional authorities to achieve a major rise in public sector employees’
salaries without an increase in budgetary revenues, so many other expenditures (including
subsidizing commuter trains) were inevitably cut.
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“Dialogue of Civilizations”, which has held numerous international events with
participation from global celebrities, and even sponsored publication of a book,
Conversations with the World’s Foremost Thinkers, where Yakunin was included
alongside some of Nobel Prize winners (Dutkiewicz, Sakwa, 2013). Despite widespread
criticism of Yakunin in the media and some attempts to cancel his job contract as CEO,
close connections with Putin made him nearly invincible and gave Yakunin carte
blanche; RZhD became a fiefdom of this crony of Putin, while its business operations
remained in the shadow of numerous offshore companies connected with Yakunin
(Navalny, 2015a).
In other words, after major reforms a formally state-owned monopoly, the biggest
employer in the country, is now possessed by a private person who has turned RZhD
into  a  tool  for  rent  maximization  and  placed  the  burden  of  costs  (arbitrarily  set  up  by
himself) on taxpayers’ shoulders. To paraphrase the Boney M hit of the 1970s, this
mode of governing the railroads can be best described as “Russia’s Greatest Rent
Machine”.  Its  social  costs  are  much  higher  than  those  of  the  MPS  model,  which
emerged in the 1930s under the leadership of Stalin’s close subordinate Lazar
Kaganovich.  MPS  served  as  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  Soviet  economy,  had  priority
access to state resources including labor and investments, and had relatively high status
in state distribution of welfare and other goods. Later on, its role decreased because of
technological changes and the decline of the Soviet economic model, and by the time of
the Soviet collapse its impact on rent seeking was relatively modest. While the crisis of
the MPS model in the 1990s has been widely recognized (Pittman, 2013; Khusainov,
2015), the consequences of the 2000s reforms may be considered as a turn from bad to
worse.
The  case  of  RZhD  is  not  the  only  example  of  failure  of  one  of  the  sectoral  reforms
which formed a large scale program of socio-economic changes in Russia under Putin
(Alexeev, Weber, 2013; Gel’man, Starodubtsev, forthcoming). But why did the good
intentions of neoliberal reforms pave a road to the hell of crony capitalism in its
patrimonial form in post-Soviet Russia? I argue that the causes of these mutations of
post-Soviet modernization are related to the emergence and maintenance of
neopatrimonial political institutions. These institutions should not be perceived merely
as inherited from the Soviet (or pre-Soviet) past; rather, they were deliberately and
purposefully built after the Soviet collapse to serve the interests of ruling groups in
Russia  and  other  post-Soviet  states  and  consolidate  their  political  and  economic
dominance (North, 1990: 16). Neopatrimonialism inhibited the potential for
implementation of a “narrow” program of socio-economic modernization (which would
exclude political democratization from government agendas). Thus, policy reforms
resulted in partial effects at best, and very often contributed to a vicious circle of
socially inefficient changes which served privileged private interests. I also argue that
this vicious circle cannot be broken by attempting to “borrow” socially efficient
institutions or “grow” them step-by-step within the given political constraints. Further
embedding of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism may increase the risk of its reinforcement
and self-reproduction regardless of possible political regime changes. I believe that the
incentives for rejection of neopatrimonial political institutions and their replacement by
“inclusive” political and economic institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012) in Russia
and other post-Soviet countries may (though not necessarily should) be strengthened by
external influence, with restriction of their sovereignty and possible compulsion from
advanced states and international actors.
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The structure of this article is as follows. First, after an overview of discussions of post-
Soviet neopatrimonialism, I present my own approach to analysis of its effects on post-
Soviet governance and policy-making, and its political constraints. Further, I explore
mechanisms of governance within the framework of neopatrimonial political institutions
(the “power vertical”) and focus on the policy reforms, which have brought few returns
and/or have resulted in unexpected and undesired consequences (the models of
“borrowing” and “growing” institutions). In the conclusion, I discuss some implications
and considerations with regard to the possibility of breaking the vicious circle of post-
Soviet neopatrimonialism.
Sources and Substance of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism
Although the labeling of the post-Soviet politico-economic order as “neopatrimonial”
has become nearly ubiquitous in the numerous works on post-Soviet Eurasia
(Derluguian, 2005; Fisun, 2012; Robinson, 2011, 2014; van Zon, 2008), the very term
and its use as a tool for analysis need a certain clarification. Patrimonialism, according
to the Weberian approach, is perceived as an instance of traditional authority, a politico-
economic order based upon appropriation of public political and economic power for
private purposes. However, neopatrimonialism is nearly by default considered to be a
manifestation of this traditional order in modern societies which, contrary to Weber, is
juxtaposed to legal-rational authority (Eisenstadt, 1978, ch. 17; Fisun, 2012). The
category of “neopatrimonial politico-economic order” covers both political regime and
model  of  governance  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  either  of  these  elements  (Robinson,
2014). Within this framework, both personalist authoritarian regimes and patrimonial
crony capitalism may be considered to be results and consequences of
neopatrimonialism in politics and governance respectively. In a more general sense, the
neopatrimonial politico-economic order represents one variety of the “limited access
order”  (North  et  al.,  2009),  with  a  prevalence  of  “extractive”  political  (and  often
economic) institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012). However, these institutions (in the
sense of the set of rules and norms, and the sanctions for their violation) are in a kind of
symbiosis, where the legal-rational shell of formal rules of the game only conceals a
neopatrimonial “core” of informal institutions (Erdmann, Engel, 2006) which have a
“subversive” influence on institutional performance (Gel’man, 2012). While some
experts note that this symbiosis is a source of instability for the neopatrimonial politico-
economic order, others argue that neopatrimonial institutions maintain an inefficient yet
self-enforcing equilibrium (Robinson, 2014).
Since the neopatrimonial politico-economic order is founded on elements of traditional
authority, it is no wonder that its most widespread explanations relate to the effects of
legacies of the past (Pop-Eleches, 2007). Neopatrimonialism is often perceived as a
rudiment of traditional societies which was so deeply embedded in their social and
political organization that it either cannot be eliminated in the process of modernization
or becomes a kind of traditionalist reaction to modernization’s failures (Eisenstadt,
1978, ch. 17). While in the case of African states (which are largely perceived as
“reservations” of various forms of neopatrimonial rule) the whole frame of reference
revolves around colonial legacies (Bratton, van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann, Engel, 2006),
in post-Soviet Russia scholars look for sources of neopatrimonialism in virtually all
stages of Russian and Soviet  history.  They assign responsibility for the embeddedness
of neopatrimonialism to the indispensable legacy of pre-Petrine Russia with its lack of
private property and arbitrary rule of autocratic leaders (Pipes, 1974), or to the legacy of
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Communist regime, which, in its late developmental stage, demonstrated decay and
“degeneration” into neo-traditionalism (Jowitt, 1983). Some scholars who do not refer
to neopatrimonialism in their analyses of post-Soviet politico-economic order and use
other categories, ranging from “patronal politics” (Hale, 2014) to “sistema” (Ledeneva,
2013),  also  focus  on  their  effects  on  politics  and  governance  through  the  lenses  of
various legacies of the past. In any case, the “legacy” argument is structural in nature:
explicitly or implicitly, neopatrimonialism is assumed to be like an inherited chronic
disease of the socio-political organism, which cannot be cured at least in the foreseeable
future.
Without denying the importance of various “legacies”, one should take into account that
the rise of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism in Russia and some other post-Soviet states, to
a large degree, was a consequence of the purposeful actions of political and economic
actors,  who  aimed  to  maximize  benefits  to  themselves  during  the  process  of
redistribution of power and resources in the turbulent post-Soviet environment. For
example, in the case of RZhD, the neopatrimonial governance of the biggest state-
owned company under Yakunin’s leadership has not resulted from the legacies of this
sector or of the Russian economy as a whole. Neither Kaganovich nor his MPS
successors ever dreamed of a degree of freedom like Yakunin’s in arbitrarily governing
their respective domains. Rather, RZhD has been turned into its CEO’s fiefdom after the
distribution  of  rent  sources  among the  members  of  the  “winning  coalition”  (Bueno de
Mesquita, Smith, 2011) led by Putin and his close associates. The maximization of
power in politics and the maximization of rents in the economy should be perceived as a
rational  goal  of  the  ruling  groups,  who  achieved  it  in  Russia  in  the  wake  of  regime
changes and market reforms. Some analyses of the dynamics of the rules of the game in
the political and economic arenas after the Soviet collapse have demonstrated that
complex transformations make it easier to achieve these goals, where they otherwise
could be more difficult (Hellman, 1998; Sonin, 2003; Aslund, 2007; Mendras, 2011;
Hale, 2014; Gel’man, 2015). The neopatrimonial politico-economic order has served as
an instrument of the ruling groups, and “subversive” institutions have maintained its
continuity and solidified the existing configurations of political and economic actors.
However, while some leaders of post-Soviet countries were able to maximize their
power and rents, others failed to do so. Unlike the “legacy” argument, the focus on
purposeful institution-building considers post-Soviet neopatrimonialism as an outcome
of conscious “poisoning” of the social and political organism by certain actors
belonging to the ruling groups. Yet answering the question of possible cures for this
kind of disease is far from straightforward.
The following are the foundational principles of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism as a
politico-economic order which defines features of political regimes and mechanisms of
governance:
(1) Rent extraction is the major goal and substantive purpose of governing the
state at all levels of authority;
(2) The mechanism of governing the state tends towards a hierarchy (the
“power  vertical”)  with  only  one  major  center  of  decision-making,  which  claims  a
monopoly on political power (the “single power pyramid”) (Hale, 2014);
(3) The autonomy of domestic political and economic actors vis-à-vis this
center is conditional; it can be reduced and/or abolished at any given moment;
(4) The formal institutions which define the framework of power and
governance are arranged as by-products of the distribution of resources within the
7
“power  vertical”:  they  matter  as  rules  of  the  game  only  to  the  degree  to  which  they
contribute to rent-seeking (or at least do not prevent it);
(5) The power apparatus within the “power vertical” is divided into several
organized groups and/or informal cliques, which compete with each other for access to
rents.
These principles are the essence of an informal institutional “core”, or de facto
constitution, of the neopatrimonial politico-economic order, around which the ruling
groups build the shell of formal institutions (such as official constitutions or electoral
systems).  This  shell  is  not  just  a  camouflage  aiming  to  hide  the  ugly  face  of
neopatrimonialism; it also serves as a mechanism of authoritarian power-sharing which
reduces the risk of regime changes and maintains a balance of power among the insiders
of the winning coalition (Svolik, 2012). Although authoritarianism in both its
“electoral” (Schedler, 2013) and “classical” (“hegemonic”) (Howard, Roessler, 2006)
forms is a by-product of neopatrimonialism in the political arena, its manifestations
should not be reduced to authoritarian regimes and risks of their subversion. These risks
emerge when the political monopolies of ruling groups are undermined and autonomy
of political and economic actors becomes limited in certain ways, so regime changes or
threats thereof are not so rare. But if these risks are averted, then neopatrimonial
governance may become invincible (if one puts aside risks stemming from exogenous
shocks for respective countries).
The symbiosis of the informal neopatrimonial “core” and the formal shell which
outwardly seems to share features with advanced states and markets, ranging from
legally independent courts to the commercial operations of state-owned companies such
as RZhD, maintains a stable yet inefficient equilibrium (Gel’man, 2012). This fact
explains a paradox which has been described by scholars of Africa: under conditions of
neopatrimonialism, the state of affairs in a given country should inevitably worsen, but
in fact disequilibrium is relatively rare (Erdmann, Engel, 2006). Formal institutions are
not the only reason for this. The stable increase of rent in post-Soviet Russia (given high
oil  prices)  has  also  helped  to  maintain  the  status  quo  despite  short-term  economic
troubles (Aslund, Guriev, Kuchins, 2010). Unlike the African neopatrimonial states and
regimes which are widely perceived as “dictatorships of stagnation” (Bratton, van de
Walle, 1994, 1997; Erdmann, Engel, 2006), post-Soviet Russia displays an opposite
trend:  the  drive  for  economic  growth  in  the  2000s  served  as  the  major  source  of
maintenance of the neopatrimonial politico-economic order. Ruling groups are
interested in growth and development not only to increase the amount of rents and to
satisfy the appetites of numerous rent-seekers but also because of the need for both
domestic legitimation of the political regime (Rogov, 2013), and the legitimation of
foreign policy on international arenas. In addition, visible and internationally recognized
achievements of growth and development, such as global mega-events (like the
Olympic Games, the G8/G20 summits, or the inclusion of universities in the top 100 of
world ratings) serve as a source of conspicuous consumption and of status rent both for
ruling groups and for societies at large.
Thus, post-Soviet neopatrimonialism implicitly assumes the aspiration of ruling groups
to successfully implement a “narrow” program of socio-economic modernization. They
aim to achieve a high degree of socio-economic development and to accomplish at least
some policy reforms oriented towards attainment of these goals. At the same time, the
“broad” agenda of political modernization (which includes democratization and
extension of political freedoms) is not openly rejected but either postponed or reduced
to naught, similarly to the “virtual liberalization” of Russia during the presidency of
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Dmitry Medvedev (Gel’man, 2015). The agenda of “narrow” modernization is shared
not only by the ruling groups of Russia and other post-Soviet countries but also by
significant  parts  of  their  citizens.  To  some  extent,  as  an  instrument  of  growth  and
development this agenda also maintains the neopatrimonial politico-economic order, at
least in the short run.3
However, under conditions of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism the agenda of “narrow”
modernization faces numerous obstacles. First, policy reforms have to be implemented
by state bureaucracy (Gel’man, Starodubtsev, forthcoming), despite its poor quality
(Worldwide, 2014). Second, policy reforms which may infringe on the interests of
influential rent-seekers will be curtailed, especially if their implementation is not
endorsed by a powerful coalition of supporters.4 Third, in these circumstances policy
reforms often lead to unintended and undesired consequences. These consequences
depend not only on specific policies in certain areas, but to a great degree on the
hierarchical mechanism of governance within the framework of the power vertical and
its institutional constraints on policy reforms.
The Power Vertical as a Tool of Neopatrimonial Governance
The term “power vertical” is usually used to describe the hierarchical model of sub-
national politics and governance in post-Soviet countries (Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, 2011).
It  assumes  formal  and  informal  subordination  of  levels  of  authority  and  a  web  of
informal exchanges between them (for electoral authoritarian regimes, vote delivery is
one of the major resources in these exchanges). But similar mechanisms are employed
not only in territorial but also in sectoral governance (including in the public sector).
One might observe sectoral power verticals within the law enforcement apparatus,
educational institutions, and some NGOs. Private business is also involved in numerous
informal exchanges within the power vertical, but it enjoys a broader autonomy.5 These
exchanges include not only distribution of rents but also compliance (or non-
compliance) with formal rules and norms and changes in formal institutions. The power
vertical is widely perceived as a legitimate mode of governance because of the
possibility of hierarchical control over lower-level officialdom. These perceptions are
reinforced by the post-Soviet experience of the 1990s, with its protracted decline of
state capacity and major distortions of law and order after the Soviet collapse (Volkov,
2002); this experience serves as an additional argument for the use of the power vertical
as a tool of neopatrimonial governance. As Adam Przeworski rightly observed, “Since
any order is better than any disorder, any order is established” (Przeworski, 1991: 86).
As long as the lower layers of the power vertical are able to distribute resources and
perform functions of social patronage, this mechanism of governing territories,
enterprises, and organizations persists.
3 Some scholars argue that in the medium term, the agenda of “narrow” modernization may
serve as an effective preparation tool for future democratization after the downfall of
authoritarian regimes (Treisman, 2014). It is too early to say to what extent these considerations
will be relevant with regard to post-Soviet neopatrimonialism.
4 The failure of police reform in Russia under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev may serve as
a prime example in this respect (Taylor, 2014).
5 For example, workplace mobilization during the 2011-2012 national elections in Russia was
less typical for private enterprises in comparison with state-owned companies and the public
sector (Frye et al., 2014).
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The use of the power vertical as a pillar of the neopatrimonial politico-economic order
leads to a major increase in agency costs and to the aggravation of principal-agent
problems within the hierarchy of governance (Sharafutdinova, 2010; Gel’man,
Ryzhenkov, 2011). For instance, while in China these problems in the system of
territorial governance are partially resolved via competition among local agents and
their mutual policing (provincial Communist bosses can be promoted to the national
leadership if and when they demonstrate excellent economic performance), post-Soviet
Russia employ other solutions. Eugene Huskey labels them “the politics of redundancy”
(Huskey, 1999). In other words, parallel hierarchies in charge of control and monitoring
emerge at various layers of the power vertical; presidential administrations exert
political control over governments, presidential representatives do the same vis-à-vis
governors  and  city  mayors,  and  so  forth.  Numerous  state  agencies  in  charge  of
regulation and monitoring in various sectors of the economy, with their own territorial
branches,  are also used as tools of control.  At first  sight,  strict  adherence to top-down
hierarchical relations against the interests of the power vertical’s lower echelons should
require the threat of punishment of subordinated actors by the top leadership for
virtually all instances of wrongdoing, misbehavior, and poor performance. But in fact,
the systematic use of repression against lower-level officials of the power vertical is
relatively  rare;  the  hierarchy  of  the  power  vertical  is  far  from  an  army-like  chain  of
command, and it operates according to a different logic.
The popular argument that the power vertical serves merely as a tool of subordination
and control is only partially true. One should take into account its other functions. As
Barbara Geddes notes, ‘the central problem for authoritarian regimes is the creation of
an appropriate set of incentives to shape behavior of their own officials’ (Geddes, 1994:
193). From this point of view, the power vertical should be considered as a provider of
selective informal incentives. The status of its insiders rewards them with extra benefits
as they receive certain exclusive gains unavailable for those actors not included in the
power vertical. The major condition for lower-level beneficiaries is that their
opportunistic behavior should not prevent the political leadership from achieving its
strategic policy goals. In the most general sense, these goals include the preservation of
a stable economic and social order, in which the ruling group runs unchallenged and
maintains the relative well-being of the population-at-large. Thanks to economic growth
and development, the principal at the top of the power vertical pyramid is able to reward
his  agents  through access  to  rents.  Thus,  corruption  is  not  merely  a  side  effect  of  bad
governance, but rather an indispensable part of the mechanism of neopatrimonial
governance within the framework of the power vertical.
In its quest to maintain the loyalty of local actors, the political leadership is forced to
use both carrots and sticks. The multiple tools of control include not only the
appointment, dismissal, and replacement of officials, but also exclusion from access to
rents and “contract-ordered” criminal investigations against officials and businessmen,
or threats thereof with the use of kompromat (Ledeneva, 2013). These instruments not
only maintain loyalty to the power vertical, but are also used as an additional
mechanism of control. Almost every actor can easily be accused of criminal acts, and
the threat of criminal prosecution is an even more efficient tool for maintaining control
than its actual use. As a consequence, actors are genuinely interested in the successful
implementation of policies which serve both the goals of political leadership and their
own  self-interest.  One  should  note  that  punishments  take  place  under  two  kinds  of
circumstances: either because actors’ rent seeking activities contradict the policy goals
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of the political leadership or (more rarely) because their poor performance undermines
the legitimacy and stability of the politico-economic order.
Thus, the power vertical is a relatively cheap (in terms of agency costs) and successful
(in terms of incentives) solution to the principal-agent problem: the principal informally
offers rent access to loyal and capable agents. This mechanism maintains the capacity of
neopatrimonial governance in multiple political and socio-economic arenas. The state
serves both the collective interests of the power vertical’s insiders as a group (or rather,
as an estate), and the private interests of all its agents, ranging from presidents and
prime ministers to local school directors who are allowed to steal public money
designated for renovation of the school building if during elections they will deliver
votes to the polling station located at their school. As for outsiders to the power vertical,
the very opportunity for access to rents is a major incentive not only for political loyalty
but also for personal career choices: for example, many graduates of Russian
universities admit that the goal of their pursuit of higher education was a chance to get
jobs in the state apparatus or in major state-owned companies such as Gazprom (Petrov,
Yadukha, 2009).
Within the post-Soviet context this mechanism of governance demonstrates some
specific features. They include, inter alia, the specific divisions among and between the
layers and corridors of the state machinery, and competition between various agencies
and informal cliques for rent access and for positions in the informal hierarchy of
decision-making. For example, Russian law enforcement agencies experience stiff
competition between the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Investigative
Committee, despite the fact that the latter agency is formally subordinated to the former
(Volkov et al., 2013). Russian big business demonstrates a rivalry between Gazprom
and Rosneft (the latter  emerged as a competitor almost by chance) (Gustafson, 2012),
and so forth. But these contradictions are mostly structural, because both state agencies
and state-owned companies are affected by sectoral power verticals which link lower-
level actors to their  patrons at  higher levels of authority or even in the top leadership.
This mechanism plays a powerful role in the informal system of governance because it
cannot be bypassed in the process of appointments or dismissals in the lower echelons
of the power vertical, and it is important for the survival of all actors in their behind-the-
scenes struggles against powerful competitors.
In the media discourse, these phenomena are often regarded as the “new Politburo” or
the “struggle between Kremlin’s towers” (Petrov, 2011), but such labels are rather
superficial. Parallels between the power vertical under the post-Soviet neopatrimonial
politico-economic order and the Soviet hierarchical model of governance do not touch
upon the basic differences in goal-setting, institutions, and incentives. In the Soviet
Union, the Communist Party exerted control over the state apparatus and was able to
impose  sanctions  on  violators  of  formal  and  informal  rules  of  the  game.  In  the  post-
Soviet environment, the personalist nature of neopatrimonialism and the interests of
powerful members of winning coalitions set up other constraints: all personnel decisions
must include the maintenance of the balance between sectoral power verticals and
cliques, and the use of “divide and conquer” tactics for prevention of open intra-elite
conflicts. The emergence of informal alliances and rivalries between actors who
compete for rent access is an unavoidable side effect of the informal distribution of
resources among agents. This competition drastically increases agency costs and
worsens rather than improves the quality of governance. Although the fruits of
economic growth may satisfy the appetites and interests of the most powerful rent-
seekers and diminish their rivalries, these contradictions cannot be eliminated.
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If  the  power  vertical  did  not  receive  demands  for  policy  reforms  from  the  top
leadership, and only reproduced the status quo, then even given a minimal inflow of
resource rent and very sluggish (if not zero) economic growth, this model of governance
could reproduce itself similarly to that of some neopatrimonial African states (Erdmann,
Engel, 2006). However, the imperative of “narrow” modernization drives the political
leadership to launch numerous policy reforms, which are to be implemented by agents
of the power vertical at various levels of authority. These reforms imply not only
structural changes (such as the establishment of new agencies) but also changes of goals
and criteria for policy evaluation. Bureaucrats and officials have to demonstrate
“efficiency”, which is broadly understood as the achievement of certain formal
indicators, ranging from conduction of auctions in the state procurement system to a
certain quantity of scholars’ publications in journals listed in the Web of Science and
Scopus databases. Policy reforms often destabilize the power vertical, but their effects
on  the  quality  of  governance  are  not  so  obvious.  Sometimes  the  state  of  affairs  even
degrades vis-à-vis the previous status quo, as in the case of the replacement of old
Kaganovichs with new Yakunins. Why do the policy reforms sometimes have such
dismal results?
The Temptation of Policy Reforms
The role of the power vertical in neopatrimonial governance is important for an
understanding of “narrow” modernization as a set of socio-economic policy reforms.
The top political leadership is the sole mastermind of reform programs and plans.6
These programs are developed by both ideationally-driven experts, contracted by the
power vertical, and career-driven policy entrepreneurs from among the mid-range
officials, and sometimes even by invited foreign consultants (Easterly, 2001). Reform
programs are implemented by various layers and hallways of the power vertical, while
the political leadership retains a monopoly on policy evaluation.7 These conditions
favor an “insulation” of reforms and reformers from the pernicious influence of interest
groups and public opinion (Geddes, 1994), yet they also impose almost unavoidable
constraints on policy reforms in virtually all areas. The main constraint is related to the
very fact that the neopatrimonial institutional “core” is untouchable by any reform: at
best, they can affect only formal institutional shells. No wonder that many reform
proposals are already planned to be partial, incomplete and compromised measures even
at the preparatory stage (not to mention further decision-making and implementation).
Initially good intentions are emasculated and perverted by rent seekers, who are
interested in privatization of gains from policy reforms and in socialization of their
losses. These problems are admitted by reformers themselves, who often already expect
these negative outcomes at the beginning of policy planning.
To  some  extent,  the  distortion  of  policy  reforms  has  become  a  side  effect  of  the
mechanisms of separation of power in post-Soviet Russia. The presidential-
parliamentary institutional design (Shugart, Carey, 1992) assigns a secondary role to
parliament and political parties, while popularly elected heads of the state unilaterally
6 Although alternative policy programs are proposed by independent experts from time to time,
they usually remain ignored by political leaders.
7 Policy evaluation is not an arbitrary personalist choice by political leaders: it takes into
account the interests of the members of the winning coalition as well as public opinion. But
under conditions of neopatrimonialism, political leadership enjoys more room for maneuver
than in most democracies.
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hire  and  fire  governments  and  prime  ministers.  The  government,  in  turn,  enjoys  a
limited  autonomy  and  performs  the  technical  (but  not  political)  function  of
implementing decisions made by the head of state. This mechanism is fairly relevant for
neopatrimonial governance: the government is more or less an administrative office of
the state, which in itself is a fiefdom of political leaders and their winning coalitions
(Gel’man, Starodubtsev, forthcoming). Hence, the cabinet of ministers is highly
fragmented: it  is  neither a group of officials who are politically responsible before the
parliament  nor  a  team of  professionals  who share  common policy  goals  and  methods.
The prime minister is responsible for coordinating this complex web of relationships.
He/she is dependent on numerous deputy prime ministers who supervise various state
agencies (and some of these – first and foremost, power ministries and the law
enforcement apparatus – are directly responsible before the head of state). As a result,
policy-making under these conditions turns into a complex and often inefficient series
of bargains and ad hoc agreements between several state agencies, and is often
perceived by observers as a very difficult process (Gilman 2010). Such complexity
contributes to a status quo bias in many policy areas.
Under these circumstances, a direct appeal by reformers to the head of state, who might
be interested in successful policy reforms in certain areas and consider them a personal
priority,  might  be  the  most  efficient  policy-making  strategy.  In  some  cases,  open
support from the top political leadership has enabled reformers to overcome resistance
from various segments of the state apparatus and implement their policy proposals via
“manual control”. The Russian tax reform of the early 2000s, conducted by the
ministers of finance and economic development and their teams with the explicit
support of Vladimir Putin, was one such “success story” (Appel, 2011; Gel’man,
Starodubtsev, forthcoming). But the other side of the coin is apparent: the number of
personal priorities of top political leaders is limited, and implementation of some
reforms may close the door to other policy changes. Moreover, if some priorities and/or
approaches to policy reforms do not show visible success, then incentives for further
changes (if not for the agenda of “narrow” modernization as a whole) may be
undermined.8 Furthermore, the very drive towards policy reforms heavily depends on
the prospects for political leaders – authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to these
considerations than democracies. For electoral authoritarian regimes, the “window of
opportunity” for policy changes closes before election cycles, which are crucial for the
survival of regimes and leaders (Hale, 2014); in “classical” (“hegemonic”) authoritarian
regimes (Howard, Roessler, 2006), incentives for policy reforms tend to decline over
time while long-standing personalist leaders remain in power.
But the major problem of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism for policy reforms is related to
its informal institutional core, which not only inhibits changes to the formal institutional
shell, but exerts a distorting influence on the directions and effects of policy changes. In
essence, any policy reforms cause major redistributive consequences. In political terms,
policy adoption and implementation implies a process of building coalitions of potential
beneficiaries of the reforms and the accommodation of their interests with those of the
potential losers. These negotiations often damage the quality of policy-making because
of the influence of “distributional coalitions”, which may block any positive changes
8 The experience of the 2005 reform of social benefits in Russia is a prime example: poorly
prepared and imperfectly funded changes which affected many pensioners and other
disadvantaged social groups caused social protests in many cities. After that, policy changes in a
number of other areas were stopped, and the very discourse of “reform” became taboo among
officials (Wengle, Rusell 2008; Pis’mennaya, 2013).
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(Olson, 1982). In the wake of democratization, these tendencies often contributed to
populist policies (as in Latin America in the 1980s), and these risks were among the
major concerns of Russian reformers in the 1990s (Zhestkim kursom, 1990; Mau,
1999). However, the neopatrimonial politico-economic order is also compatible with
distributional coalitions, and their influence has increased over time (Shirikov, 2010).
Despite the populist rhetoric of post-Soviet neopatrimonial leaders, the major
beneficiaries of this politico-economic order are small privileged groups of rent seekers.
Thus, the power vertical became a mechanism of rent sharing among members of
winning coalitions, who transferred the costs of policy reforms to other actors and/or to
society at large. They do not face the constraints imposed by formal institutions; rather,
the informal institutional core of the neopatrimonial politico-economic order is
deliberately tuned for distributive effects of this kind. Thus, the privatization of benefits
and socialization of losses have become inevitable effects of policy reforms under
neopatrimonialism. The rapid economic growth of the 2000s to some extent diminished
these effects, but if and when Russia faced certain crises, the contradictions of policy
reforms became explicit.9 Their distributive effects increase until the potential decline of
inflow of rents causes major conflicts between rent seekers.
The  reform  of  RZhD  clearly  illustrates  these  tendencies.  Yakunin,  being  CEO  of  the
holding and one of the key members of the winning coalition, maximized benefits for
RZhD and for himself. The company became a monopolist holding, managed by
Yakunin on behalf of the Russian state in the manner of a fiefdom, without any external
control over its operations. The benefits of the reforms for the company were apparent:
RZhD no longer had to subsidize unprofitable commuter trains, was able to unilaterally
set  up  tariffs,  received  outstandingly  high  fees  for  the  use  of  its  assets  by  its  own
subsidiaries and prevented competition on the market. Costs were transferred not only
to passengers (individual consumers of monopolist services) but also to all taxpayers.
As long as regional budgets were able to satisfy RZhD’s appetites, this situation was
considered unacceptable only by opposition activists (Navalny, 2014, 2015a), and did
not attract major public attention. The transferring of costs from regional to federal
budgets may have diminished the salience of this problem for a while but does not
change its causes.
The other problem of policy reforms under neopatrimonialism is related to the very fact
that the hierarchical power vertical is the only (imperfect) instrument of their
implementation.  Reformers  and  their  patrons  among  the  top  political  leaders  assume
nearly by default that without strict and tight top-down control, the lower layers of the
power vertical have no incentives even for their routine performance (let alone policy
changes). Given the lack of other mechanisms of accountability (fair elections, free
media, civil society NGOs, public opinion etc.), these concerns are quite reasonable.
The good intentions of efficient governance are opposed by the weak incentives for
policy changes in other political and institutional contexts (Pressman, Wildavsky,
1973). And post-Soviet Russia is by no means exceptional in this respect. Yet the
neopatrimonial politico-economic order is the least likely environment for successful
implementation of major policy reforms. Since the list of beneficiaries of these changes
is limited to a narrow group of rent seekers, reformers have to force other actors to
9 In Russia’s case, these redistributive effects resulted in a sharp increase in military expenditure
and simultaneous cutting of expenditures on public health and education; the proposal of a
reform of school education, which aimed to abolish free schooling for pupils (Lyubimov, 2015),
became a logical extension of this approach to policy reforms.
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conduct  reforms  which  may  not  bring  them  any  benefits.  At  the  same  time,  policy
programs and plans of reform are based upon the logic of “high modernism” (Scott,
1998): the criteria for successful implementation of changes by the lower layers of the
power vertical are reduced to a number of formal quantifiable indicators.10 The
formalization of these requirements to some extent aims to reduce excessively high
agency costs within the framework of the power vertical. However, this approach
contributes to the spiral of overregulation: virtually every new policy change results in a
drastic increase of the scope and density of regulation of almost all routines at the lower
layers. Hence, the amount of paperwork and related costs skyrockets – police officers,
school teachers, medical doctors and all personnel on the ground in many organizations
(both state and private) are mired in producing numerous reports instead of conducting
their primary job functions. As a result, the very goals of policy changes are replaced by
the attainment of required numbers in reports at any cost: these reports became the
major if not the only criterion of evaluation of policy performance.
The system of reporting in the law enforcement agencies, which focuses on the
percentage of criminal statistics vis-à-vis respective previous periods, only aggravates
numerous pathologies and replaces the task of combating crime (Volkov et el., 2013;
Paneyakh, 2014). Similarly, numerous inspection agencies discover those violations of
laws which require the least effort to detect and prove. The introduction of the Unified
State  Exam  (EGE),  the  new  mechanism  of  assessment  of  high  school  graduates  in
various regions of Russia,  serves as an even more notorious example of this approach
(Gel’man, Starodubtsev, forthcoming). Soon after its introduction in 2009, the
presidential administration included the proportion of school graduates who fail to pass
the  EGE  into  the  list  of  criteria  for  assessment  of  the  performance  of  regional  chief
executives (Reuter, Robertson, 2012). This innovation encouraged regional and local
officials (ranging from heads of education departments to school teachers) to minimize
the number of failures on exams every year, causing numerous prominent scandals
(such as the over-performance of school graduates in republics of the North Caucasus).
At last, in 2014, the list of criteria was changed again, and regional chief executives
could no longer be punished for the failures of teenagers in the EGE. But due to these
changes, the percentage of failures could greatly increase, resulting in schools’
performances worsening vis-à-vis their previous results. As such, the requirements for
passing the EGE were eased to such a degree that achieving minimally acceptable
grades was not difficult for even the least capable pupils (Lyubimov, 2015).
Another  case  of  policy  reforms is  the  attempt  to  improve  the  business  environment  in
Russia in accordance with Putin’s May 2012 decree. The key indicator chosen for
implementing these changes was Russia reaching 20th place in the annual global report
Doing Business, produced by the World Bank. This report is based on evaluation of
conditions for small and medium businesses via analysis of regulatory frameworks and
surveys of entrepreneurs. Although most analysts were skeptical about the chances of
such progress (in 2012 Russia was in 120th place), in the 2015 annual report Russia
reached 62nd place out of 189. This achievement, however, was possible because the
World Bank experts changed the methodology of their report and included more
indicators of subnational regulations: the changing set of criteria elevated Russia’s rank
by 30 places in comparison with the 2014 annual report (Doing Business, 2015).
10 One example is Putin’s May 2012 decrees, which called for the percentage of articles
published by Russian scholars and scientists in Web of Science journals to be raised by 2.44%
by 2020.
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Regardless of Russia’s ranking in World Bank reports, the problems for doing business
as such were very different: the impressive progress of quantitative indicators was
achieved at a moment of stagnation (if not recession) in the Russian economy, record-
high capital flight, etc. Needless to say, these approaches to post-Soviet policy reforms
in various areas brought only partial and incomplete results at best, or even became
limited to short campaigns which included the construction of Potemkin villages and
contributed to the waste of resources, similarly to their Soviet-era predecessors.
Does this mean that the agenda of “narrow” modernization has no hope of fulfillment
under conditions of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism? This question is not straightforward
to  answer.  The  inflow  of  resource  rents  in  Russia  and  other  post-Soviet  states  in  the
2000s enabled at least partial implementation of policy reforms, and in some policy
areas socio-economic reforms were far from a total failure (for an overview of Russia,
see Alexeev, Weber, 2013). But reforming the formal institutional shell without changes
in the informal institutional core of post-Soviet neopatrimonialism brought major
positive effects only in certain circumstances. If and when policy adoption and
implementation did not require the involvement of many layers and hallways of the
power vertical, and reformers were “insulated” from numerous rent seekers because of
the priorities and sincere support of the top political leadership, then major
advancements could be achieved, as in the case of the tax reforms and the establishment
of the Stabilization Fund in Russia (Appel, 2011; Zaostrovtsev, 2010; Gel’man,
Starodubtsev, forthcoming). But when reformers employ alternative strategies for
institutional change in pursuit of the agenda of “narrow” modernization, policy reforms
in various areas often result in unexpected and undesired consequences.
“Borrowing” and “Growing” of Institutions: The Vicious Circle?
Most of the experts involved in the preparation and development of plans and programs
of policy changes clearly understand the pernicious effects of the neopatrimonial
institutional core on policy reforms. However, being hired by the authorities, they
refrain from criticism of major obstacles for the implementation of the latter’s policy
ideas. Similarly to experts from international organizations (Easterly, 2001), they use an
Aesopian language full of euphemisms such as “poor quality of institutions” or
“unfavorable institutional environment”, referring to numerous “legacies” and
“institutional traps”. Since the very discussion of major revision of the foundational
principles of neopatrimonialism (and hence the rejection of the entire politico-economic
order) is a kind of taboo, the experts seek ways not to undermine these obstacles but to
bypass or circumvent them. The key idea is not a demolishing of existing informal
institutions but rather a parallel establishment of new formal institutions which are
based  on  other  principles  than  the  institutional  “core”  of  neopatrimonialism.  It  is
expected that the new formal institutions will be more efficient, and for this reason they
may become embedded over time. According to these ideas, parallel institution-building
can gradually supplant the informal institutional core and pave the way for a further
strengthening of “inclusive” economic institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012) and, in
the distant future, toward a slow step-by-step adoption of “inclusive” political
institutions. This approach perfectly fits the logic of “narrow” modernization and leaves
reformers wide room for maneuver in institution-building.
In reality, two complementary strategies of institution-building, namely the “borrowing”
and “growing” of institutions, have been proposed as possible solutions by a group of
Russian  scholars  (Kuzminov  et  al.,  2005).  “Borrowing”  implies  a  transplantation  of
16
those institutions which have proved their efficiency in a variety of political and
institutional contexts (not necessarily Western ones) and could be adopted in Russia for
the purposes of economic growth and development without major risk of immediate
undermining of the neopatrimonial institutional core. “Growing”, by contrast, assumes
that  new  norms,  rules  and  mechanisms  of  governance  in  certain  policy  areas  can  be
initially established as experimental innovations under deliberately designed favorable
conditions, and later on may be spread further in these and other areas. In theory, both
of these strategies look reasonable and are often suggested by international experts in
developing countries (Easterly, 2001). But the practice of post-Soviet
neopatrimonialism puts them into a question because of their essential flaws.
The “borrowing” of institutions, which includes transfer of advanced models and
practices of governance, is faced with the process dubbed “shitization”, or perversion
(Zaostrovtsev, 2009). Initially, this term was used to indicate the declining quality of
goods produced in Russia with the use of foreign technologies: domestic managers have
few incentives to maintain quality control and often intentionally violate technological
standards against the background of imperfect quality of corporate governance.
Similarly, one might observe perversion  of transferred institutions by those actors who
conduct their adoption and implementation in post-Soviet Russia. To some extent, this
process is inevitable, because the transfer of certain institutions would impose
excessively high costs on mid-developed states (including post-Soviet countries). For
example, the EGE in Russia is simultaneously used as a final test for school graduates
and an entrance exam for universities, while in the US and a number of other countries
these two forms of test are conducted separately. The adoption of a cheaper institutional
solution caused a number of problems in the implementation of the EGE (Starodubtsev,
2011). But more often the cause of perversion  reflects the “interests of those with the
bargaining power to devise new rules” (North, 1990: 16). The adaptation of “borrowed”
institutions to post-Soviet conditions is accompanied by their intentional and deliberate
distortion by powerful actors interested in the preservation and strengthening of the
neopatrimonial institutional core.
A  typical  example  of  perversion   of  borrowed  institutions  is  the  experience  of
implementation of the “open government” initiative in Russia under the presidency of
Dmitry Medvedev. The idea of a more open and transparent government with active
participation of ordinary citizens in policy discussions and the extensive use of modern
information technologies was vigorously advocated by Medvedev’s team as a part of
the political rhetoric of “virtual liberalization” (Gel’man, 2014). The state designated
special finding for these purposes, and a minister responsible for open government
affairs was appointed to the cabinet. However, the mechanism was adopted from the
Western  practice  of  e-government,  which  assumes  the  use  of  the  Internet  both  for
provision of state services and for feedback between citizens and the state (including
civic legislative initiatives and the like). In the Western political context, e-government
works as a complementary mechanism to democratic governance, an addition to free
elections, independent media, rule of law, etc. In Russia, however, open government
was designed as a substitutive mechanism of governance (Petrov et al., 2014), and
intended to work instead of these political institutions, which had been eliminated
and/or emasculated in the 2000s. From the viewpoint of governance in the West, e-
government served as an additional tool which helped to increase the efficiency of the
post-Weberian state apparatus. But in Russia, open government was considered a
substitution for the administrative reform which had failed in the 2000s – and had done
so not least because of the work of Medvedev himself, who had been responsible for
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overseeing it while he was serving in the presidential administration (Gel’man,
Starodubtsev, forthcoming). It is no wonder that the early promises of open government
remained largely unfulfilled; its role was limited to technological issues of the websites
of state and municipal agencies and some opportunities for ordinary citizens to submit
their letters of complaint via the Web. “Open government” has not empowered Russian
citizens. They remain powerless supplicants vis-à-vis officials, who may or may not
respond to these complaints at their own discretion. The final episode of perversion  of
open government occurred in February 2015, when the Foundation for Combating
Corruption (led by Navalny) proposed the legislative initiative on ratification of Article
20 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which assumed,
inter alia, criminalization of illicit enrichment of state officials (Russian authorities
previously  refused  to  ratify  this  part  of  UNCAC).  Navalny  and  his  team  gathered
100,000 signatures from Russian citizens via the Web, which was a mandatory
condition for further inclusion of this citizen legislative initiative into the parliamentary
agenda. But since this proposal was against the interests of Russia’s ruling group, the
open government board (appointed by state officials) declined the legislative initiatives
using flimsy excuses (Navalny, 2015b). The very ideas of openness, transparency and
civic activism became irrelevant in this case.
Another approach to developing new formal institutions which aims to constrain the
neopatrimonial institutional core is based upon purposeful “growing”, or deliberate
cultivation of new norms, rules and mechanisms of governance and their gradual
extension to new areas and policy fields. This approach includes not only promotion
and advancement of spontaneously emerging good practices but also experimental
establishment and embedding of new norms, rules and mechanisms of governance by
reformers who, in turn, are explicitly or implicitly backed by the political leadership.
Since large-scale institutional changes are often countered both by the power vertical
and by public opinion, the “growing” of institutions sometimes serves to prepare more
fertile grounds for certain policy innovations, while the changes’ experimental nature
allows their details to be tested, thus averting the risks of full-scale institutional failures.
From this viewpoint, the “growing” of new institutions is an appropriate technological
solution which also makes it possible to overcome resistance to major policy reforms.
The EGE in Russia had no chances of being backed by educators or by public opinion,
so in 2001 it was initially proposed as an “experiment”. Later on, the geographical
scope of this “experiment” expanded, and by 2008 the full-fledged adoption of the EGE
as the only mechanism of assessment of school graduates became unavoidable.
However, the side effect of this “success story” was the lack of legitimacy of the EGE
in the eyes of many Russian citizens, and endless attempts to diminish its ultimate
influence on entrance to universities (Starodubtsev, 2011; Gel’man, Starodubtsev,
forthcoming). But experiment as a method of policy reform is a double-edged sword: its
poor conduct and/or inefficient implementation can put an end to institutional
innovations.11
In most cases, failures of “growing” of new institutions are caused by political rather
than technological factors. Most large-scale institutional innovations are rather costly,
face resistance from various rent seekers and bureaucratic inertia, and also need public
11 As for reforming school education in Russia, the failed implementation of state financial
obligations (so-called “educational vouchers”), which were intended to link the amount of state
funding for university education of school graduates with their EGE results, is indicative. It was
initially proposed in a number of regions, but had no positive effects, and the very idea has been
buried (Starodubtsev, 2011).
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legitimation. The patronage of the top political leadership is necessary but often
insufficient for accomplishment of these goals. This is why the “growing” of institutions
is often accompanied by the use of special organizational devices, known in the Latin
American context as “pockets of efficiency” (Geddes, 1994). Their essence is that the
political leadership prioritizes a limited number of pet projects, which are implemented
not within the framework of the hierarchy of the power vertical, but via deliberately
created organizations and groups which enjoy exceptional official status and may
operate beyond standard routines. Thanks to their relative autonomy and effective
patronage, these organizations and groups may escape from bureaucratic control, bear
lower agency costs in comparison with their standard equivalents, and have more room
for maneuver thanks to promises of achieving breakthroughs. Sometimes these promises
are fulfilled, but this whole game is rather risky.12
The economic growth of the 2000s and the inflow of extra revenues and rents gave post-
Soviet political leaders numerous opportunities to patronize several pet projects, with
some  hopes  of  their  advancement  to  successful  pockets  of  efficiency.  But  the  fate  of
these projects depends upon the further careers of their patrons as well as upon their
resource endowment, which is necessary to achieve major effects. In the Russian
context, the experience of the major high-tech innovation project Skolkovo is indicative.
During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency it served as his top priority and received very
generous funding from the Russian state and Big Business, despite serious skepticism
from key players in the field (Pynnöniemi, 2014). After Medvedev’s departure from the
presidential post Skolkovo’s funding was greatly reduced, its proposed role as a key
driver of technological progress and rapid economic development was nearly forgotten,
and several financial scandals finally buried its reputation (Reiter, Golunov, 2015).
More recently, economic troubles have led to the shrinkage of the time horizon for
planning, and so the post-Soviet political leadership is more interested in short-term
achievements from pockets of efficiency, rather than their long-term plans of diffusion
of institutional innovations.
Pockets of efficiency are short-lived not only because of the fortunes of political
leadership and their changing priorities and problems with continuity of funding. Even
if pockets of efficiency perform well and accomplish their initial tasks, they barely
survive the subsequent routinization and the loss of exclusive status. At the same time,
their good practices are often poorly diffused and may be rejected by other
establishments unless they are imposed top-down by the political leadership. Finally,
the “pockets” are efficient precisely because of their compactness: when they begin to
expand their scope and become “too big to fail”, they may face degradation because
their modes of governance often copy the institutional core they aimed to combat. The
logic of “institutional isomorphism” (Di Maggio, Powell, 1983) suggests that the
neopatrimonial core is able to rebuild pockets of efficiency, rather than vice versa, and
the potential incubators of new institutions may contribute to rent seeking and serve the
goals of the power vertical similarly to their predecessors.
To summarize, one might argue that the parallel presence of the neopatrimonial
institutional core and new norms, rules, and mechanisms of governance may be
instrumental in policy reforms in certain areas, but cannot resolve their fundamental
12 The “Toy Army” of Peter the Great may be considered as the closest analog for “pockets of
efficiency” in Russian history: it served as a launching pad for a regular military establishment.
The Soviet atomic bomb and space programs to a great degree relied upon special design
bureaus (also known as sharashki), which may be regarded as the Stalinist version of “pockets
of efficiency”.
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contradictions. The neopatrimonial politico-economic order imposes high barriers to the
implementation of the agenda of “narrow” modernization (for a review in Russia, see
Alexeev, Weber, 2013). Neither the “borrowing” nor “growing” of institutions as such
can increase the chances of success of policy reforms. Rather, their plans may be
sacrificed for the sake of the survival of regimes, or at a certain point may be launched
again,  thus  contributing  to  a  “vicious  circle”  of  elusive  chances  for  successful  socio-
economic advancements. The experience of the neopatrimonial political-economic order
in Africa (Easterly, 2001) demonstrates that such a circle’s pernicious influence cannot
be easily constrained by new norms, rules, and mechanisms of governance;
neopatrimonialism can reproduce itself under various conditions.
Concluding Remarks: How to Break the Vicious Circle?
Are there any chances to ultimately break the vicious circle of post-Soviet
neopatrimonialism? The sources of positive answers to this question are connected with
possible regime changes after leadership turnover (Treisman, 2014) and with extensive
international influence enhanced by globalization (Ledeneva, 2013); these processes are
closely linked and interrelated (Levitsky, Way, 2010). Although both arguments sound
convincing, a close look at the neopatrimonial politico-economic order in the post-
Soviet area and beyond might cast a bit of skepticism on these hopeful trends: both
regime changes and international influence are necessary yet insufficient conditions for
breaking this vicious circle.
Henry Hale, in his comparative study of post-Soviet regime changes, has demonstrated
that the political dynamics is often cyclical by nature, and leadership changes as such do
not result in major changes in the politico-economic order: it seems that the
neopatrimonial core will be given a new coat of paint rather than constrained. Scholars
of African neopatrimonialism observe that this politico-economic order could survive
and reinvent itself regardless of numerous changes of leadership and regime (Bratton,
van de Walle, 1994, 1997; Erdmann, Engel, 2006), while only aggravating problems of
quality of governance (Easterly, 2001). Such threats are equally real in the post-Soviet
context.
With regard to international influence and globalization, one should take into account
that the neopatrimonial politico-economic order can adjust to these changes and
establish  a  suitable  interface  with  the  outside  world  without  major  constraint  on  its
informal institutional core. Becoming a raw material-supplying appendage of advanced
countries – first and foremost, of China (a possible future for Russia) – may preserve
neopatrimonialism rather than undermine it, as the experience of many African states
demonstrates. As Levitsky and Way vigorously argue, even well-developed linkages
with the West have a limited impact on non-democratic regimes if they do not coincide
with the extensive use of Western leverage (Levitsky, Way, 2010). This disjuncture
between involvement in a global web of trade, migration and education, and
preservation of the neopatrimonial politico-economic order in domestic arenas, results
from the insulation of neopatrimonialism from outside influence with the use of state
sovereignty as a tool for maintaining the status quo. Under neopatrimonialism, state
sovereignty serves as a shield for ruling groups; it helps to insulate them from the
weakening of political and economic power and to protect them from undesirable
institutional changes. The idea of defense of sovereignty at any cost (including banning
foreign NGOs and limiting the import of Western foods as well as cultural products) is
not paranoia but a rational strategy of the Russian political leadership, which claims
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sovereignty of the country while having in mind the preservation and enlargement of
their personal “fur storages”. Meanwhile, external constraints on Russia’s state
sovereignty imposed by advanced countries may (but not necessarily should) create
barriers for the neopatrimonial institutional core, and in the longer term lead to a
revision of the politico-economic order. From this viewpoint, the experience of Eastern
European countries after EU accession and their need to follow the rules of the game of
Greater Europe severely reduced the pernicious effects of neopatrimonial “patronal
politics” in these countries (Hale, 2014), although it is too early to speak of its full-scale
elimination.
However, in the case of Eastern European countries, EU-led external constraints
of state sovereignty become possible due to the voluntary choice of their elite and
citizens. In Russia this issue is far from the agenda, to put it mildly.. The problem here
relates not only to the resistance of Russia’s ruling groups and/or the attitudes of its
citizens, but also to the incredibly high costs for those nations which may impose
constraints on the sovereignty of other states. Even for the EU, attempts to enforce the
integration of Eastern European states were quite costly, and this process is far from
complete (to put it  mildly).  For Russia and some other post-Soviet  states,  the possible
costs of externally imposing and enforcing new rules and norms aimed at overcoming
neopatrimonialism would be prohibitively high (even if governments and citizens may
not resist these efforts in certain circumstances) – unless this politico-economic order
becomes a major problem for the West. This is why an absence of external intervention
into the neopatrimonial politico-economic order, which would contribute to preserving
the status quo, is the more likely scenario: both the fears and the hopes of Western-
driven constraint of sovereignty in post-Soviet area seem unreasonable. However, one
cannot exclude the possibility that the further aggravation of Russia’s confrontation
with the West, which was launched after the 2014 regime change in Ukraine, may turn
into a major challenge of this kind. From this viewpoint, Russia’s possible defeat in a
new Cold War with the West may pave the way to external constraint of its sovereignty
and provide certain incentives for a gradual replacement of neopatrimonial political and
economic institutions by more inclusive rules and norms. One cannot even imagine the
possible level of outstandingly high costs for such a complex transformation of the
politico-economic order. Yet the costs of preservation of the vicious circle of post-
Soviet neopatrimonialism may be even higher for Russia and for the outside world.
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